Contractual Democracy

Hans Gersbach

Review of Law & Economics, 2012, vol. 8, issue 3, 823-851

Abstract: Recent contributions suggest that introducing political contracts could make liberal democracy more efficient without altering its fundamental values. Such contracts might foster the public ’s trust in politics. In this article, we review and structure the current state of affairs on Contractual Democracy. We discuss four archetypes of political contracts and ways of implementing them. We outline the certification and control procedures for political contracts, and address the major concerns arising with regard to Contractual Democracy.

Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Contractual Democracy (2008)
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DOI: 10.1515/1555-5879.1618

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