Complementary Platforms

Patrick Van Cayseele and Jo Reynaerts

Review of Network Economics, 2011, vol. 10, issue 1, 33

Abstract: This article investigates the pricing decisions in two-sided markets when several platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The results indicate that the anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets. On the other hand, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights is not monopoly pricing.

Keywords: two-sided markets; complements; the anticommons problem; advertising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Complementary platforms (2007)
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1213

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