Competition For Versus In the Market of Long-Distance Passenger Rail Services
Cherbonnier Frédéric,
Marc Ivaldi,
Muller-Vibes Catherine and
Karine Van der Straeten ()
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Cherbonnier Frédéric: Toulouse School of Economics and Sciences-Po, Toulouse, France
Muller-Vibes Catherine: Toulouse Business School, Toulouse, France
Review of Network Economics, 2017, vol. 16, issue 2, 203-238
Abstract:
This paper is aimed at evaluating the net gains and trade-offs at stake in implementing the competition of the rail mode in the long distance passenger market either by means of franchise or by an open access mechanism. We simulate the outcomes of competition in and for the market using a differentiated-products oligopoly model allowing for inter- and intra-modal competition in a long distance passenger market. Specifically we first calibrate the model using data describing high speed lines in France and show that the incumbent railway operator’s strategy does not simply boil down to a short-term profit maximization (e.g. because of existing regulation or limit-pricing strategy). This yields two important results when simulating competition. First, whether it is for or in the market, the opening to competition does not guarantee a decrease in prices in favor of passengers. Second, the effects of opening up to competition for the market are relatively predictable and potentially positive, while those of opening up to competition in the market remain very uncertain.
Keywords: intermodal competition; oligopoly model; open access (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L90 R40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
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DOI: 10.1515/rne-2018-0007
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