Bill and Keep as the Efficient Interconnection Regime?

Julian Wright

Review of Network Economics, 2002, vol. 1, issue 1, 7

Abstract: In this paper I review the recent paper by DeGraba (2000) that proposes a version of Bill and Keep (called COBAK) as the efficient interconnection regime. I argue while the proposed interconnection regime is suitable for some types of interconnection it would be quite undesirable for others. I show that whether the COBAK approach is suitable for a particular type of interconnection depends on, among other things, the importance of network externalities and on the willingness of called parties versus calling parties to pay for calls.

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1002

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