The Impact of Competition Intensity on Software Security: An Empirical Analysis of Web Browser Patch Releases

Jo Arrah-Marie ()
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Jo Arrah-Marie: 551887 IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire – Campus de Rennes , Cesson-Sevigne, France

Review of Network Economics, 2024, vol. 23, issue 4, 161-198

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between competition intensity and the security level provided by software vendors, in particular when the software is free of charge to users. We examine the case of web browsers, a key component of internet security where vendors compete on quality and generate revenue through advertising. Using a pooled cross-sectional dataset on web browser security patch releases from 2009 to 2018, we analyze how competition affects the promptness of these releases. Our findings reveal that higher market concentration can enhance a vendor’s responsiveness in addressing vulnerabilities, though this positive effect weakens when a vendor becomes excessively dominant.

Keywords: information security economics; patch release time; quality competition; free software; software vulnerability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/rne-2024-0045

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