Incentive Regulation in Network Industries: Experience and Prospects in the U.S. Telecommunications, Electricity, and Natural Gas Industries

Hemphill Ross C., Meitzen Mark E. () and Schoech Philip E.
Additional contact information
Hemphill Ross C.: Christensen Associates
Meitzen Mark E.: Christensen Associates
Schoech Philip E.: Christensen Associates

Review of Network Economics, 2003, vol. 2, issue 4, 22

Abstract: We trace the development of incentive regulation in the U.S. telecommunications, electricity, and natural gas industries. Telecom has moved much more in the direction of pure price cap regulation. Incentive regulation in electricity and gas has generally not strayed far from rate-ofreturn regulation. Reasons for these differences include differences in regulatory commitment, industry concentration, technological change and productivity growth, service quality concerns, and externalities. We conclude that electricity and gas can evolve to purer forms of price caps as they gain more experience with incentive regulation, and if the unique features of these industries are considered in plan design.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1032 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:4:n:3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyte ... journal/key/rne/html

DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1032

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Network Economics is currently edited by Lukasz Grzybowski

More articles in Review of Network Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().