The Arbitrage Mirage: Regulated Access Prices with Free Entry in Local Telecommunications Markets

Thomas Hazlett and Havenner Arthur M.
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Havenner Arthur M.: University of California, Davis

Review of Network Economics, 2003, vol. 2, issue 4, 11

Abstract: Incumbent telecommunications carriers have been mandated to share their networks with new retail service providers at regulated wholesale rates. This regulatory structure creates options which incumbent systems must write and which all potential entrants are awarded at a price of zero. Intense debate revolves around the effect of the policy in promoting investment in network infrastructure or retarding it. Rival viewpoints in the policy discussion, however, appear to share the fundamental position that the options issued entrants by incumbent network owners are a transfer of wealth. This paper notes that, to the extent that the regulations actually achieve their purpose in eliminating entry barriers, the assumption is incorrect. Eliminating the sunk costs associated with providing network services can result in regulatory arbitrage that reduces the value of the option to enter to zero. The U.S. market for local telecommunications has witnessed characteristic elements of this rent seeking competition, and financial markets suggest that investors have begun to incorporate the view that the regulated wholesale access regime results in zero long-term profits for entrants.

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1037

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