The Economics of IPR Protection Policies: Comment

Francisco Martínez-Sánchez

Review of Network Economics, 2007, vol. 6, issue 4, 5

Abstract: We provide a theoretical result on the effect of piracy on the sales of legal product using the same framework as Gil (2006). We obtain that when the illegal sector is perfectly competitive and the marginal cost of the legal firm and the quantity tax are small enough, piracy does not lead to lower sales of the legal product.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1133

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