Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector

Francis Bloch and Axel Gautier ()

Review of Network Economics, 2008, vol. 7, issue 2, 24

Abstract: In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1146 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Access pricing and entry in the postal sector (2009)
Working Paper: Acces pricing and entry in the postal sector (2008)
Working Paper: Access pricing and entry in the postal sector (2006)
Working Paper: Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector (2006)
Working Paper: Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:7:y:2008:i:2:n:3

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rne/html

DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1146

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Network Economics is currently edited by Lukasz Grzybowski

More articles in Review of Network Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().