Worksharing: A Calibrated Model

Billette De Villemeur Etienne (), Helmuth Cremer, Boldron Francois and Roy Bernard
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Billette De Villemeur Etienne: Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ)
Boldron Francois: La Poste
Roy Bernard: La Poste
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Etienne Billette de Villemeur

Review of Network Economics, 2008, vol. 7, issue 2, 22

Abstract: This paper studies the price structure in a postal sector with a monopolistic operator when customers can engage in worksharing. It presents simulation results obtained from an empirical model that is calibrated on data from the French postal sector. The optimal worksharing discount is significantly larger than the avoided costs. Consequently, the appropriate pricing structure differs markedly from the often recommended ECPR policy.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1149

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