Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks

Paul Joskow

Review of Network Economics, 2008, vol. 7, issue 4, 14

Abstract: This paper examines developments since the publication of The Economics of Regulation in the theory of incentive regulation and its application to the regulation of unbundled electricity transmission and distribution networks. Conceptual mechanism design issues that arise when regulators are imperfectly informed and there is asymmetric information about costs, managerial effort, and quality of service are discussed. The design and application of price cap mechanisms and related quality of service incentives in the UK are explained. The limited literature that measures the effects of incentive regulation applied to electricity networks is reviewed.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1161

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