 The Political Economy of Sectoral Credit Provisioning in India: An Empirical AnalysisStatistics, Politics and Policy, 2021, vol. 12, issue 2, 413-456 Abstract: Electoral dynamics is believed to have a direct bearing on the scope of governmental control over the supply of credit to different economic sectors. This paper attempts to examine the impact of opportunistic electoral manipulations, ideological beliefs and political lobbying on the supply of agricultural and industrial credit across the Indian states. The findings indicate that more competitive elections are associated with increases in credit provision. An incumbent party with a more liberal ideology is found to provide greater average credit to agriculture relative to industry. Finally, an increase in the political contributions provided to an incumbent state government is found to entail greater industrial credit and lower agricultural credit, on an average. Keywords: credit provision; electoral competition; legislative assembly elections; political contributions; political lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:statpp:v:12:y:2021:i:2:p:413-456:n:9 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Statistics, Politics and Policy is currently edited by Joel A. Middleton More articles in Statistics, Politics and Policy from De Gruyter |
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