Self-Interest or Solidarity?

Mueller Sean (), Vatter Adrian and Schmid Charlie
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Mueller Sean: University of Berne – Institute of Political Science, Fabrikstrasse 8, Berne 3012, Switzerland
Vatter Adrian: University of Berne – Institute of Political Science, Fabrikstrasse 8, Berne 3012, Switzerland
Schmid Charlie: University of Berne – Institute of Political Science, Fabrikstrasse 8, Berne 3012, Switzerland

Statistics, Politics and Policy, 2016, vol. 7, issue 1-2, 3-28

Abstract: This article puts the self-interest hypothesis to an empirical test by analysing the 2004 referendum on fiscal equalisation in Switzerland. That vote put forth a series of reforms which created regional winners and loser in terms of having to pay or receiving unconditional funding. Although Switzerland is usually portrayed as a paradigmatic case in terms of inter-regional solidarity and national integration, we show that rational and selfish cost-benefit calculations strongly mattered for the end-result. We rely on a multi-level model with referendum and other data on more than 2700 municipalities and all 26 cantons. More broadly, our findings confirm that rational choice theory works well for voting on straightforward monetary issues with a clearly defined group of winners and losers. However, symbolic interests such as party strength and cultural predispositions against state intervention and in favour of subsidiarity also matter and need to be taken into account alongside.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/spp-2016-0003

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