Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems

Birkmeier Olga, Käufl Andreas and Pukelsheim Friedrich
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Birkmeier Olga: University of Augsburg, Institute for Mathematics, Augsburg, Deutschland
Käufl Andreas: University of Augsburg, Institute for Mathematics, Augsburg, Deutschland

Statistics & Risk Modeling, 2011, vol. 28, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: Ternary decision rules allowing for abstentions,besides Yea- and Nay-votes, are analyzed. The German Bundesrat serves as a prime example. We show that the decision-making efficiency of the Bundesrat would increase if abstentions were allowed. A general formula for the mean success margin of a ternary decision rule is derived assuming selfdual and permutationally invariant distributions. The ternary Penrose–Banzhaf model is discussed in detail, and the influence probabilities of voters and a rule´s influence sensitivity are evaluated.

Keywords: decision-making efficiency; Penrose-Banzhaf index; straight majority rule; unanimity rule; voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1524/stnd.2011.1066

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