A promise kept? The first years of experience of the Appeal Panel of the SRB

Lamandini Marco and Muñoz David Ramos
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Lamandini Marco: Professor of Law, University of Bologna. Member of the SRB Appeal Panel and former member and Chair of the Joint Board of Appeal for the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). The views in this paper are expressed in a personal capacity only, and do not purport to represent the views of any of the institutions the author is or has been affiliated with. This publication is part of the line of research within PRIN 2020-2023, Main Researcher: Prof. Marco Lamandini.
Muñoz David Ramos: Professor of Law, University Carlos III of Madrid. Alternate Member of the Appeal Panel for the Single Resolution Board, and of the Joint Board of Appeal for the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs). The views in this paper are expressed in a personal capacity only, and do not purport to represent the views of any of the institutions the author is or has been affiliated with. This publication is part of the line of research within PRIN 2020-2023, Main Researcher: Prof. Marco Lamandini, and Project PID2020-114549RB-I00 of the Spanish State Plan for Scientific and Technical Research and Innovation Projects 2017 – 2020. Business and Markets: Digital (R)evolution, Integrity and Sustainability and its assimilation by Private, Regulatory and Competition Law. Principal Researchers: Profs. David Ramos-Muñoz and Antonio Robles.

Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft (ZBB) / Journal of Banking Law and Banking (JBB), 2023, vol. 35, issue 3, 158-168

Abstract: Within the institutional architecture for financial supervision within the EU, courts coexist with quasi-courts, i. e., review bodies like the ESAs Joint Board of Appeal, the SSM’s Administrative Board of Review (ABoR) and the SRB’s Appeal Panel. This has parallels e. g. US Administrative Law Judges (ALJs). Some argue that this flight away from courts is justified because administrative law and procedure are more flexible. Yet administrative mechanisms are deceptively simple. This paper offers a cautionary tale about the complexities of all quasi-judicial arrangements and their competing and complementary role with courts and presents an analysis of the European framework from both a functional and a comparative perspective.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.15375/zbb-2023-0304

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