Pricing with Monitoring Costs

Steven Coissard and Carlos Seiglie

Brussels Economic Review, 2011, vol. 54, issue 4, 421-433

Abstract: This paper presents empirical evidence which at first glance appears to show that firms are not pricing to maximize profits. We then present a model to explain how this behavior is in fact optimal when we account for additional constraints faced by firms in certain product markets.

Keywords: Price Discrimination; Monitoring Costs; Pricing Anomaly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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