Altruism, moral hazard, and sharecropping

Jiancai Pi

Agricultural Economics, 2016, vol. 62, issue 12, 575-584

Abstract: The paper provides a new explanation for the emergence of sharecropping in agriculture. Under the principal-agent moral hazard framework, the choice of the agrarian land lease contracts is discussed from the perspective of behavioural economics. The analyses show that the landlord and the tenant's behaviour patterns play an important role during the course of the contractual choice. Specifically, the combination of altruism and moral hazard can lead to sharecropping, which gives an explanation greatly different from the existing theoretical literature.

Keywords: altruism; behavioural economics; fixed rent contract; moral hazard; sharecropping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/doi/10.17221/219/2015-AGRICECON.html (text/html)
http://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/doi/10.17221/219/2015-AGRICECON.pdf (application/pdf)
free of charge

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:62:y:2016:i:12:id:219-2015-agricecon

DOI: 10.17221/219/2015-AGRICECON

Access Statistics for this article

Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Ing. Zdeňka Náglová, Ph.D.

More articles in Agricultural Economics from Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ivo Andrle ().