Asymmetric competition in food industry with product substitutability
Yong-Cong Yang and
Pu-yan Nie
Additional contact information
Yong-Cong Yang: Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, P.R. China
Agricultural Economics, 2016, vol. 62, issue 7, 324-333
Abstract:
The paper analyses the effects of asymmetric competition on food industry with product substitutability by establishing a two-stage dynamic game model. The equilibrium is captured under both the Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition. Firstly, under the Cournot competition, lower costs yield a higher quality, more outputs and higher profits. Secondly, the cost difference increases the quality difference, the market size difference and the profit difference. Thirdly, a U-shaped relationship between the product substitutability and the food quality exists. Finally, compared with the case under the Cournot competition, the food security is significantly reduced with the lower quality and less outputs in the case under the Stackelberg competition.
Keywords: food quality; game theory; non-cooperative; product substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/doi/10.17221/130/2015-AGRICECON.html (text/html)
http://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/doi/10.17221/130/2015-AGRICECON.pdf (application/pdf)
free of charge
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:62:y:2016:i:7:id:130-2015-agricecon
DOI: 10.17221/130/2015-AGRICECON
Access Statistics for this article
Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Ing. Zdeňka Náglová, Ph.D.
More articles in Agricultural Economics from Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ivo Andrle ().