Effects of corporate social responsibility on food safety
You-Hua Chen,
Pu-yan Nie and
Yong-Cong Yang
Additional contact information
You-Hua Chen: College of Economics & Management and Guangdong Center for Rural Economic Studies, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, China
Yong-Cong Yang: Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China
Agricultural Economics, 2017, vol. 63, issue 12, 539-547
Abstract:
This paper develops the theory of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the food industry. The effects of CSR on the food industry are captured. First, we argue that CSR reduces the profits of a CSR firm under monopoly. Second, under complete information, regulation does not improve social welfare. We find that both active price regulation and active quality regulation reduce a monopolist's profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, under incomplete information, the monopolist exaggerates quality as much as possible. With quality regulation, CSR reduces exaggerated quality in the food industry.
Keywords: food quality; game theory; quality regulation; social welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/doi/10.17221/177/2016-AGRICECON.html (text/html)
http://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/doi/10.17221/177/2016-AGRICECON.pdf (application/pdf)
free of charge
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:63:y:2017:i:12:id:177-2016-agricecon
DOI: 10.17221/177/2016-AGRICECON
Access Statistics for this article
Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Ing. Zdeňka Náglová, Ph.D.
More articles in Agricultural Economics from Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ivo Andrle ().