La manipulation du résultat comptable avant une offre publique

Arnaud Thauvron

ACCRA, 2000, vol. 6, issue 2, 97-114

Abstract: This study tests the hypothesis that managers affirms that are bidders of takeovers on a subsidiary reduce reported earnings of the target. The objective pursued is to minimize the offer price. An examination of 95 tender offers provides evidence of earnings decrease. No manipulation of accruals is observed. Three alternative hypothesis are proposed.

Keywords: earnings manipulation; takeover; accruals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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