Choix des cabinets d'audit et évaluation des titres introduits au second marché

Géraldine Broye ()

ACCRA, 2001, vol. 7, issue 2, 105-124

Abstract: In many countries, IPO issues are caracterised by a phenomenon of underpricing. Among the alternative reasons for underpricing are the ex ante uncertainty and information asymmetries between issuers, investors and underwriters. In this context, we suppose that the choice of a prestigious auditor acts as a favorable signal which enables the underpricing of the issues to be limited. Our results, from a sample of IPOs on the French secondary market, lend support for the hypothesized negative relation between the auditor?s reputation and the level of underpricing. Moreover this study shows that the choice of a prestigious underwriter also reduces the level of underpricing.

Keywords: audit; signaling; IPO; underpricing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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