Coûts d'agence et changements de commissaire aux comptes: une approche empirique

Charles Piot

ACCRA, 2003, vol. 9, issue 2, 5-30

Abstract: This study investigates the role of agency costs concerning auditor changes and reputation adjustments decisions in French listed companies. Theoretical precepts suggest a positive relationship between the level or evolution of agency costs and auditor reputation. Univariate and logistic analysis of 41 auditor change and 44 auditor renewal companies, between 1996 and 1998, documents that the auditor change decision itself is mainly driven by a regulatory factor (i.e. the termination of non-effective joint-auditing engagements). Elsewhere, the increase in leverage over the last six financial years is an incentive for companies to nominate more reputed statutory auditors, consistent with the hypothesis that the credibility of accounting numbers depends on agency costs generated by leverage.

Keywords: agency costs; financial reporting; audit quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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