Les mécanismes de gouvernement d'entreprise et la publication volontaire des résultats en France

Faten Lakhal

ACCRA, 2006, vol. 12, issue 2, 69-92

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to study corporate governance mechanisms likely to be associated with manager?s choice to voluntarily announce their earnings in case of concentrated ownership market. The findings show that firms releasing frequently their earnings are more inclined to have large ownership structure, to enclose institutional investors in their capitals, to have dual leadership structure and to offer management stock-option plans. They also show that managers occasionally release their earnings in order to inform the market that they are doing well. Lastly, quarterly earnings announcements are associated with US listing where forecast disclosures with executive stock-option plans.

Keywords: corporate governance; voluntary disclosure; ownership structure; stock options; board (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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