Gestion des résultats et retraits volontaires de la cote: Le cas des OPRO en France

Isabelle Martinez and Stéphanie Serve

ACCRA, 2011, vol. 17, issue 1, 7-35

Abstract: This article investigates the accounting behaviour of managers who voluntarily bring their firm private in the context of a BOSO (the French mechanism of Buy out Offer with Squeeze Out). We make the hypothesis of negative earnings management before the delisting in order to minimise the price offered to minority shareholders. A quantitative study is performed using a unique dataset spanning 1997-2006. This data set consists of 140 French firms, of which 70 were voluntarily delisted via BOSO and 70 were business-matched control fi rms. We measure the discretionary accruals and we find a significative earnings management one year before the delisting for the firms which were voluntarily delisted (around ? 6 % of total assets). Conversely, the control sample exhibits no earnings management. The results show more aggressive earnings management when the majority shareholder did not enhance its control just before the delisting.

Keywords: delisting; earnings management; accruals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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