Les auditeurs financiers face aux conflits d'agence: une étude des déterminants des honoraires d'audit en France

Chiraz Ben Ali and Cédric Lesage

ACCRA, 2013, vol. 19, issue 1, 59-89

Abstract: Considering the audit of financial statements as a mechanism that reduces information asymmetry, one can hypothesize that agency conflicts influence audit fees. Studying the audit fees paid by the SBF 250 listed firms, our results show : 1) the absence of a significant relationship between managerial ownership and audit fees ; 2) a curvilinear relation (inversed U shape) between controlling shareholders ownership and audit fees ; 3) a negative relation between family control and audit fees. These results outline the dominance of agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in France, unlike in Anglo-Saxon countries where the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders. The study permits to draw practical implications for practitioners and regulators.

Keywords: audit fees; controlling shareholders; minority expropriation; agency conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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