Politiques nationales de lutte contre le changement climatique et réglementation de la concurrence: le cas de la fiscalité

Jérome Rieu

Economie & Prévision, 2002, vol. 155, issue 4, 95-113

Abstract: The obligation to comply with the Kyoto protocol prompts many governments to tax greenhouse gas emissions. Basic efficiency is supposed to be obtained by imposing a single tax rate on the entire economy. This article shows that the need for global economic efficiency may make tax relief for certain sectors socially desirable within the framework of an imperfect multilateral agreement. This raises a fresh problem for the global and European competition authorities, for whom decentralised application of basic mechanisms normally leads to a global optimum.

Keywords: climate change; optimum taxation; competition rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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