Combinaison des instruments prix et quantités dans le cas de l'effet de serre

Boris Cournède and Sylviane Gastaldo

Economie & Prévision, 2002, vol. 156, issue 5, 51-62

Abstract: Under uncertainty regarding marginal abatement costs, a market for pollution rights is not efficient in dealing with cost risks. The paper presents a hybrid instrument in which the market price is bounded by a floor price via a subsidy and a cap price via a tax. The optimal instrument is computed in an analytical case study. In light of arguments against subsidies, an asymmetric instrument with a tax cap and no price floor is introduced and the optimum is determined. Hybrid and asymmetric instruments are seen to be particularly appropriate to the specific nature of climate change. Other possible combinations of taxes and permits are also examined.

Keywords: greenhouse gas emissions; negotiable permits; environment; public economics; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Combinaison des instruments prix et quantités dans le cas de l’effet de serre (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_156_0051

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