Évolutions et asymétries des règles européennes de politique budgétaire et mise en œuvre du Pacte de stabilité

Sébastien Pommier

Economie & Prévision, 2004, vol. 162, issue 1, 95-109

Abstract: The stability pact is a rule of budget discipline which recommends relinquishing contra-cyclical activism in favour of automatic stabilisers in order to regulate the economic cycle. This article seeks to describe the budget rules followed by European governments since 1970 in order to test the reliability of the stability pact approach. The results show that the primary balance becomes more inert and has a greater corrective effect on debt trends from 1992. Debt correction seems to be attributable to discretionary policies. Disciplined budget rules nevertheless display a certain cyclical assymmetry: discretionarypolicyseemstobepro-cyclicalduringslowdownsandacyclicalduringrecoveries.Automaticstabilisersare also less extensive during economic downturns.

Keywords: stability and growth pact; budget rules; EMU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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