Constitution européenne: redistribution du pouvoir des États au Conseil de l'UE

Frédéric Bobay

Economie & Prévision, 2004, vol. 163, issue 2, 101-115

Abstract: Using a game theory approach, this article analyses the impact of the European Constitution on the relative power of Member States in the European Union Council (with and without the Turkey membership hypothesis). Compared to previous voting systems, the main effect of the Constitution is to sharply increase the influence of the biggest Member State (Germany or Turkey), as well as that of the smallest Members (Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia...). This is a result of a power redistribution from the medium size Member States (Hungary, Belgium, Portugal, Czech Republic, Greece, Netherlands...). Spain and Poland account for a significant lost of influence, considering the high level obtained in the Nice Treaty voting system. Concerning France, there is no impact of the Constitution when compared to Nice on the short term, but the impact becomes significantly negative on the long term under the hypothesis of EU enlargement to Turkey.

Keywords: power index; cooperative games; voting power; European Union; Banzhaf (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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