Salaire à la performance: incitation ou sélection ?

Edward Lazear

Economie & Prévision, 2004, vol. n° 164-165, issue 3, 17-25

Abstract: The growth in variable pay is usually associated with the desire to provide incentives. However, the sorting explanation has beenunder-emphasized. Frequently, data are consistent with the sorting explanation as well as the incentive story, but the implications, both at positive and normative levels, are quite different. The evidence from the real world is consistent with the use of variable pay as a selection or sorting device, particularly at the managerial level. The importance of the sorting explanation is greatest in new industries.

Keywords: incentives; sorting; selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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