Hétérogénéité structurelle des pays membres et conflit d'objectifs entre les autorités économiques dans l'UEM

Séverine Menguy

Economie & Prévision, 2005, vol. n° 169-170-171, issue 3, 41-58

Abstract: Many studies have underlined the conflict of goals between European economic authorities after a negative supply shock: monetary policy is restrictive to preserve price stability, whereas fiscal policies are expansive to sustain economic activity. Our studyextendsthisresulttotheconsequencesofstructuralheterogeneitybetweenmembercountriesofamonetaryunion.Inaunion, monetary-policy tightnessdepends ontransmissionchannels, whichareclearly heterogeneous. Incertain short-termandstructural configurations ? in particular for countries of very different size ? structural heterogeneity can accentuate the conflict of goals between the central bank and the governments; it can also aggravate the escalation of interest-rate hikes and excessive public deficits.

Keywords: Economic and Monetary Union; structural heterogeneity; policy mix; shock stabilization; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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