Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ?

Frédéric Loss (), Estelle Malavolti-Grimal and Thibaud Vergé

Economie & Prévision, 2007, vol. n° 178-179, issue 2, 115-124

Abstract: This article focuses on decentralized implementation of European Union competition policy. Delegating the control of interfirm agreements makes it possible to benefit from better local information. However, because of conflicts of interest, decisions taken may not be in line with overall economic welfare. We show that this problem can be alleviated when the central authority delegates auditing but retains decision-making control. However, the central authority must make concessions: it must sometimes follow the national authority's recommendations in order to give the latter adequate incentives to collect information.

Keywords: competition policy; decentralization; imperfect audit; manipulable information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Journal Article: Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ? (2007)
Working Paper: Comment décentraliser la politique européenne de concurrence ? (2007)
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