Politique environnementale et politique de la concurrence

Maia David

Economie & Prévision, 2007, vol. n° 178-179, issue 2, 125-138

Abstract: This article studies the conflictingobjectives ofanenvironmental protection agencyanda competition-policyauthorityin an asymmetric duopoly. We examine cases where the competition-policy authority may oppose an environmental tax in order to prevent a firm from acquiring a dominant position and/or to minimize the risk of tacit collusion. We then study an environmental policy based on pollution-abatement investments, which may involve, for example, a design standard or voluntary agreement. We show that the competition authority may prefer such a policy to a tax when the most efficient producer is also the most polluting.

Keywords: environmental policy; competition policy; environmental tax; pollution-abatement investment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Journal Article: Politique environnementale et politique de la concurrence (2007)
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