Allotissement et rendements d'échelle. Application aux réseaux de transport ferroviaire

Julien Lévêque

Economie & Prévision, 2007, vol. n° 180-181, issue 4, 147-159

Abstract: This paper analyzes the scope for the awarding of contracts to multiple bidders in regional railway networks. We estimate economies of scale at a disaggregated level, the only one now relevant for analyzing European railway markets. Our results show that economies of scale in regional networks are not significant. The monopoly of a single railway operator in an entire regional network is thus not justified, given the expected benefits of competition. We therefore propose the break-up of the regional networks, with due regard for network effects (interconnection costs), the contestability of individual contracts (information rents) and procurement procedures (transaction costs).

Keywords: economies of scale; natural monopoly; networks; railways; regional trains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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