Tolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale: une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg

Mohamed Ali Bchir, Nicolas Daures and Marc Willinger

Economie & Prévision, 2008, vol. n° 182, issue 1, 33-46

Abstract: Our article presents an experimental assessment of a tax-evasion prevention mechanism proposed by Greenberg (1984). Greenberg argued that tax evasion cannot totally be eliminated in a population. On the basis of this observation, he developed a mechanismin which the audit probability is determined byagents'earlierfraud behavior. We observethatthe distribution of subjects differs from the model's prediction. The discrepancy is due to the existence of an increasing relationship between the decision to commit fraud and income a relationship that the model does not take into account. Our results suggest that Greenberg's mechanism is based on an over-restrictive hypothesis.

Keywords: random audit; penalty; fraud; reporting; income; tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Tolérance de la fraude et évasion fiscale: une analyse expérimentale du modèle de Greenberg (2008)
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