Le mieux, ennemi du bien: approche expérimentale du contrôle comme mécanisme de filtrage
Nadia Joubert and
Economie & Prévision, 2010, vol. n° 195-196, issue 4, 127-146
In an adverse-selection context, we use an experimental protocol to study the intensity and efficiency of a control policy as filtering instrument in the long-term financing relationship between an investor (principal) and an entrepreneur (agent). We find three control effects : a disciplining effect, an educative effect, and a filtering effect. While the first is expected, the educative effect of control gives way to a crowding-out effect already observed in other tests but in a moral-hazard context. Lastly, our experiment shows that the principal restores a filtering effect through a trade-off between control efficiency and control intensity : it is better to control little in order to detect a little, rather than control a lot and detect nothing.
Keywords: control; filtering; long-term relation; principal-agent model; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_195_0127
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