L'aide contre l'immigration

Jean-Paul Azam () and Ruxanda Berlinschi

Revue d’économie du développement, 2009, vol. 17, issue 4, 81-108

Abstract: This paper highlights an empirically significant trade-off between the aid flows delivered by donor countries and the inflows of migrants that they receive from developing countries. It draws the implications for aid policy from a simple game-theoretic model, after reviewing the recent literature on the effects and motivations of foreign aid to developing countries. The paper is part of the recent effort by economists, goaded by the dead end in which the ?aid ineffectiveness? literature had cornered itself, to discover the hidden agenda behind foreign aid.

Date: 2009
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