EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Cash Holdings

Aitzaz Ahsan Alias Sarang, Nicolas Aubert () and Xavier Hollandts

Finance, 2021, vol. 42, issue 1, 7-49

Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between board gender diversity and corporate cash holdings (i.e., liquidity risk) and excess cash holdings (i.e., agency risk). Using a sample of French firms listed on the SBF 120 index over the period 1998-2015, we find a significant positive relationship between board gender diversity and two measures of corporate cash holdings ? corporate cash ratio and industry-adjusted cash ratio ? and a negative relationship between board gender diversity and excess cash holdings. These results support the notion that feminized boards are associated with lower liquidity and agency risk, implying that women directors are more rigorous at monitoring, preventing managers from stockpiling cash beyond the optimal level. In relation to the Cop?-Zimmermann gender quota law, the study provides significant intermediate results that are robust to alternate specifications and tests.

Keywords: cash holdings; women directors; gender quota; appetite for risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=FINA_421_0007 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-finance-2021-1-page-7.htm (text/html)
restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Cash Holdings (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:finpug:fina_421_0007

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Finance from Presses universitaires de Grenoble
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().

 
Page updated 2021-12-20
Handle: RePEc:cai:finpug:fina_421_0007