La théorie de l’agence et la concession des services publics: le cas des chemins de fer camerounais

Honoré Bidiasse

Mondes en développement, 2017, vol. n° 177, issue 1, 121-137

Abstract: The aim of this article is to evaluate the relevance of the principal-agent model as a framework for the concession analysis of the Cameroonian railway. Several parameters define this agency relationship: the power delegation from the State (principal) to the dealer (agent), the hypothesis of information bias in favor of the agent, the existence of a risk sharing mechanism. However, the agency theory is undermined due to the poor definition of the perimeter of the concession. Consequently, there is an increase of agency costs and this paves the way for actors? strategic behaviors.

Keywords: Regulation; Agency Relationship; Agency Theory; Information Asymmetry; Risk-sharing; Concession; Railway (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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