13. Pourquoi certains lobbies sont-ils plus puissants que d’autres ? L’analyse économique des groupes d’influence hétérogènes

Guillaume Cheikbossian

Regards croisés sur l'économie, 2016, vol. n° 18, issue 1, 203-212

Abstract: In this article, we present several recent economic studies of heterogeneous groups of interests. We focus on two types of heterogeneity: in terms of group size, measured by the number of members, and in terms of member preferences across and within groups. Regarding the size, we emphasize on the collective action problem and the associated paradox according to which larger groups are potentially less influential than smaller groups due to a greater free-rider problem. As for preference heterogeneity, we mainly emphasize on the intensity of the resulting lobbying conflict of interests.

Date: 2016
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