Les rémunérations du travail: une affaire d’incitations ?

Claire Federspiel and Mathieu Sadourny

Regards croisés sur l'économie, 2020, vol. n° 27, issue 2, 77-83

Abstract: According to agency theory, monetary incentives contribute to reducing moral hazard and anti-selection at work. We discuss their relevance at both the theoretical and empirical levels.

Date: 2020
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