Coordination des politiques budgétaires entre pays et variable de stratégie de la Banque centrale

Daniel Laskar ()

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 3, 553-561

Abstract: In a two-country model where the policy-mix in response to symmetric shocks is considered, we analyze the effect of the coordination of fiscal policies between countries in a monetary union and under a flexible exchange rate. It is shown that results can be very different depending on what is taken as the strategy variable of the central bank at the Nash equilibrium. When this variable is the nominal interest rate, international coordination of fiscal policies is beneficial only in a monetary union. But when the strategy variable of the central bank is the inflation rate, the gain of such a coordination is smaller in a monetary union than under a flexible exchange rate. Classification JEL : F42, E63, F33

JEL-codes: E63 F33 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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