Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires

François Boldron and Cyril Hariton ()

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 3, 655-664

Abstract: This paper shows that a regulator should not regulate a final product which industry is characterized by the need of an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two main reasons drive this result. First, the regulator maximizes social welfare and values more the final good production than the producer itself. Second, the regulator has access to an extra source of financing with the profits of the whole regulated sector. Classification JEL : D82, L12, L51

JEL-codes: D82 L12 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_523_0655 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2001-3-page-655.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Journal Article: Relation verticale et régulation. Le problème des biens intermédiaires (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_523_0655

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().