Indexation des salaires, discrétion et réputation dans un modèle de politique monétaire

Giuseppe Diana ()

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 1, 43-61

Abstract: Discretionary monetary policy leads to an inflationary bias. The disappointing results obtained by the reputation building approach, initiated by Barro and Gordon [1983] to solve this bias, rely on a static and non realistic behaviour of the private sector?s agents. By integrating indexation in their behaviour, we demonstrate the existence of a reputational equilibrium in both finite and infinite horizon models. Moreover, we demonstrate that, in a finite horizon model, the equilibrium inflationary bias is decreasing with the indexing parameter. Finally, when the horizon becomes infinite, we obtain a reputational equilibrium with no inflationary bias. Classification JEL : E5

JEL-codes: E5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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