Le rôle de la relation de clientèle comme barrière à l'entrée sur les marchés bancaires

Laurent Weill

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 2, 201-222

Abstract: This paper aims at providing theoretical foundations to the role of customer relationship as a strategic barrier to entry on banking markets. A bank which grants a loan to a customer gains a comparative advantage in information on this customer as compared with competitors. This informational asymmetry gives to the bank a monopoly power on its customers: customer relationship acts as a ?switching cost? for the borrowers. We elaborate a model of strategic barriers to entry in which customer relationship allows the incumbent bank to prevent the entry of a more efficient bank. Classification JEL : D43, G21, L14

JEL-codes: D43 G21 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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