Demande induite et réglementation de médecins altruistes

David Bardey

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 3, 581-588

Abstract: Induction demand phenomena has usually been considered like a doctor?s moral hazard behaviours. The first result of this paper is to reveal that these phenomena is a simple adverse selection problem. Thanks to the fact that health state is an argument of the doctor?s utility, we build a mechanism where doctors have incentives to reveal the true illness of their patients. Classification JEL : I18, L51, D82

JEL-codes: D82 I18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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