Monnaie de crédit et dettes privées

Xavier Ragot

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 3, 679-688

Abstract: We analyze the causes of money circulation when the issuance of private debts allows agents to transact with each other. We show in general equilibrium that credit money enables agents to transfer their costs of debt management to the banking system. If the cost to access to liquidity is too high, then agents can go back to private debt transactions and the economy gets de-monetized. We focus on the choice of the number of transactions by each agent and the de-monetization process. Finally, we show that this model can explain some aspects of the evolution of barter in Russia in the 90?s. Classification JEL : E41, E51, L11

JEL-codes: E41 E51 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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