Durée des contrats et indemnisation du chômage. Une analyse quantitative du dualisme du marché du travail français

Javier Ortega and Laurence Rioux

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 6, 1273-1303

Abstract: The interplay between unemployment compensation and the duration of contracts is analysed in a matching framework. The unemployed after a permanent job are entitled to a long period of unemployment insurance ( UI ). The unemployed after a temporary job are not eligible for UI. The former receive offers for permanent and temporary jobs while the latter find only temporary jobs. The variables of the model are estimated using the European Panel. Then some reforms of the unemployment compensation system and of the temporary contracts? legislation are simulated. More generous insurance or assistance benefits slightly raise the unemployment rate and the social welfare. Increasing the legal duration of temporary contracts or their transformation rate in permanent contracts strongly decreases the rate of unemployment and improves the welfare of all the individuals. Classification JEL : J41, J64, J65

JEL-codes: J41 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_536_1273 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2002-6-page-1273.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Journal Article: Durée des contrats et indemnisation du chômage. Une analyse quantitative du dualisme du marché du travail français (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_536_1273

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().