Beveridge ou Bismarck, quelles conséquences sur le bien-être d'agents hétérogènes?

Stéphane Rossignol and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

Revue économique, 2003, vol. 54, issue 3, 541-550

Abstract: We compare the optimal insurance contribution rate and welfare levels for two opposite social insurance systems: a beveridgean one and a bismarckian one. The social contribution rates are decided by majority voting rule in both cases. In a model where agents earn heterogeneous incomes, we determine which system is preferred by which class of agents. Classification JEL : D7, H5

JEL-codes: D7 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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