Un effet externe positif à l'embauche. L'amélioration de la connaissance de la qualité des travailleurs

Paul Makdissi () and Cyril Téjédo

Revue économique, 2004, vol. 55, issue 1, 93-102

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a model in which hiring of unexperienced workers has a public good characteristic in revealing information on workers quality. We analyze the macroeconomic consequences of a microeconomics phenomenon : The job matching. In this framework, we show that a decentralized hiring process of unexperienced workers is suboptimal in regards to firms joint profits. A public hiring policy increases joint profits and, under some conditions, also increases employment. Such a public policy may be seen as a reduction of social charges on low wages. Classification JEL : H41, J23, J68

JEL-codes: H41 J23 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_551_0093 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2004-1-page-93.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_551_0093

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().